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Constraints on Data in Worlds with
Closed Timelike Curves
Phil Dowe†
It is claimed that unacceptable constraints on initial data are imposed by certain
responses to paradoxes that threaten time travel, closed timelike curves (CTCs) and
other backwards causation hypotheses. In this paper I argue against the following
claims: to say “contradictions are impossible so something must prevent the paradox”
commits in general to constraints on initial data, that for fixed point dynamics so-
called grey state solutions explain why contradictions do not arise, and the latter have
been proved to avoid constraints on initial data.
1. Introduction. Spacetimes containing closed timelike curves (hence-
forth, CTCs) may appear to allow for data that leads, by the normal
operation of local physics, to contradictions. So why will such contra-
dictions not arise? Some (e.g., Arntzenius and Maudlin 2002) appear to
hold that there are two approaches to such contradictions. The first simply
says contradictions are not possible so something must happen to prevent
them. This is claimed to entail unacceptable constraints on initial data.
There is debate over whether these constraints really are unacceptable
constraints (Smith 1997; Sider 2002; Dowe 2003), but I will not engage
that debate here. The second approach, due originally to Wheeler and
Feynman (1949) in the context of their hypothesis of advanced and re-
tarded radiation, provides a ‘grey state’ solution to paradoxes. This, it is
claimed, does not entail constraints on initial data. I will argue that grey
state solutions are not likely to throw much light on standard grandfather
paradoxes.
2. Logic or Physics? The first approach has as its exemplar, David Lewis
(1976). Arntzenius and Maudlin (2002, 170) call his the “stonewalling
response”; I will use the label ‘logic’. Time-travelling Tim attempts to kill
his grandfather. He will not succeed, but what will happen? “The forces
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of logic will not stay his hand” (Lewis 1976, 148). Rather, something will
happen to prevent it. “Perhaps some noise distracts him at the last mo-
ment, perhaps he misses despite all his target practice, perhaps his nerve
fails, perhaps he even feels a pang of unaccustomed mercy” (Lewis 1976,
149). Perhaps he slips on a banana skin. Continue the story with one of
these ‘explanations’. As Maudlin puts it, when paradox threatens, “the
circumstances always act to thwart the killing” (1990, 304) and again, “If
success is logically impossible then failure, however baroquely contrived,
must occur” (304). Arntzenius and Maudlin say, “by logic indeed incon-
sistent events cannot both happen. Thus in fact all such schemes to create
paradox are logically bound to fail. So what is the worry?” (2002, 170).
But Arntzenius and Maudlin have two worries. First, there is a need
to explain why such schemes always fail. Lewis has an explanation for
failure in each particular case: a banana skin in one, and earthquake in
another. But these are disparate independent explanations with nothing
to unify them. So there is no explanation for why such schemes always
fail. Second, ‘logic’ entails unacceptable constraints on initial data. This
is unacceptable, says Maudlin, because it appeals to “deus ex machina”
solutions (1990, 304). There are two sorts: (a) miracles, that is, violations
of laws. For example, Tim’s bullet just stops midair. I will not consider
miracles in this paper. (b) Then there are “conspiracies,” or constraints
on initial conditions. Lewis needs a banana skin or an earthquake or . . .
lurking in the background conditions. A set of background conditions
that lacks any means to prevent the paradox is ruled out. Hence initial
data is constrained. This is unsatisfactory, says Maudlin, because “mir-
acles and conspiracies are rejected in serious physical inquiry” (1990, 305).
It is also problematic because in a deterministic world constraints on data
entails earlier constraints, and hence we might have empirical evidence
in the world now that there will never be time machines.
The second approach, I will call ‘physics’. This has as its exemplar, the
work of Kip Thorne and his students (e.g., Echeverria, Klinkhammer,
and Thorne 1991), and draws on the approach due to Wheeler and Feyn-
man (1949). Take a paradox machine yielding two contradictory trajec-
tories. Assuming a Postulate of the Continuity of Nature, there will always
be a consistent solution intermediate to the two paradox states, involving
self-interaction. Thorne et al. studied the motion of ‘billiard balls’ (particle
surrounded by a hard sphere, two-body potential) through a time-shifted
wormhole (a time machine). Suppose we have a wormhole with a certain
short time shift, depicted in Figure 1a. One can set initial conditions a1
such that the dynamics lead to a paradoxical state: if b1 and c1 obtain
then there will be a collision, meaning b1 and c1 will not obtain (the so-
called ‘Polchinski paradox’, e.g., Thorne 1994, 51). Thorne and his stu-
dents showed that in addition to the paradox solution, there is also the
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Figure 1. Spatial representations of (a) the Polchinski Paradox and (b) Grey State
Solution.
‘grey state’ solution, where the ball grazes itself, deviating its trajectory
slightly to b2, and c2, leading to the grazing collision (Figure 1b). Indeed,
there are many such solutions, and that is so for any initial data. Thus
there is no need to constrain the initial data, that is, no need for con-
spiracies. Says Maudlin, “Time travel is possible without the expedient
of miracles or conspiracies” (1990, 307). Says Novikov, “The laws of
physics automatically prevent the paradox” (1998, 260).
This grey state solution is a superior explanation, one might infer from
Arntzenius and Maudlin’s treatment, because it explains why there is never
a contradiction, it does not appeal to conspiracies, and it provides a unified
explanation similar to the way gravity provides a unified explanation for
why you can never walk up a wall no matter how often you try (Novikov
1998, 260). As a matter of physical necessity paradox states will not arise.
We should note, as do Arntzenius and Maudlin, that the grey state
approach is not completely general because there might be dynamics that
do not admit of fixed-point solutions (see especially Maudlin 1990). My
argument will not trade on this.
The claim, then, is that ‘physics’ (grey state solutions) is superior to
‘logic’ (contradictions cannot happen, something must happen to prevent
the contradiction) for three reasons: One, ‘Physics’ avoids initial con-
straints (except for dynamics with no fixed point solution); Two, ‘Physics’,
but not ‘logic’, explains why no contradictions arise; and Three, ‘Logic’
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entails constraints on initial data that in turn entail constraints on earlier
initial data. This would seem to indicate that grey state solutions are more
apt than ‘logic’ to throw light on grandfather paradoxes. Maudlin says,
“Lewis’ appeal to conspiracies in the avoidance of paradox is not nearly
as stimulating as Wheeler and Feynman’s project” (1990, 314). Arntzenius
expresses the same sentiment: “While philosophers of time have been
yammering on about banana peels, physicists have been calculating
whether such ‘glancing blow’ solutions always exist” (Arntzenius 2006,
608). However, in Section 3 I show that C is not true in general, in Section
4 I show that B is false, and in Sections 5 and 6 I provide arguments that
undermine A. I conclude that grey state solutions are not likely to throw
much light on standard grandfather paradoxes.
3. The Lion, the Switch, and the Banana. The first curious thing about
the alleged dichotomy between logic and physics is that the proofs about
consistent grey state solutions concern cases where data is posed before
the time travel region, that is, the region containing CTC’s. But standard
grandfather paradoxes, if they are to be realised in space-times containing
CTC’s, must involve data posed in the time travel region. Thorne and
associates never claimed that there were no constraints on data posed in
the time travel region, as Arntzenius and Maudlin report, for such cases
“there is no clear pattern” (in this section I will illustrate this) (2002, 190).
Versions of the grandfather paradox can be given where the ‘initial data’
is such that it could be posed before the time travel region: Tim decides
(somehow irreversibly) that if he ever comes across a time machine he
will use it to go back and kill his earlier self. But these are not the standard
grandfather paradox. It seems, then, that the claim that ‘logic’ entails
constraints but ‘physics’ doesn’t turns merely on the causal structure of
the examples employed. But even so, we shall see that the ‘logic’ response
to standard grandfather paradoxes does not in general entail constraints.
The basis for the claim that ‘logic’ (contradictions cannot happen, some-
thing must happen to prevent the contradiction) entails constraints on
initial data is the reading that ‘logic’ commits to a scenario I will call
‘bananas’. Suppose we attempt to pose data c1 in Figure 1a. To do so we
take a region R including c1 such that all points in R are timelike to each
other. Say R also includes a1. Then ‘bananas’ is the solution that something
present in the region will prevent the paradoxical collision, something that
has a causal history independent of c1 and a1. The claim, then, is that
‘bananas’ entails constraints because it is not possible to pose data in R
that includes c1 and a1 but no such banana.
But is such data open to a grey state solution? Yes and no. In everyday
cases, such as Tim’s attempt to kill his grandfather, the data is vague and
underspecified. Say it’s posed in such a way as to allow for c1 or c2 (see
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Figure 1a and b). Then indeed the grey state solution in Figure 1b is
indeed possible. Tim has inherited a brain condition that causes him to
be slightly inaccurate in his shooting, thus merely wounding Grandfather,
producing the heritable brain condition. But it is open to the paradox
monger to disambiguate: The Empire sends back only those grandfather
killers who lack the brain condition.
Actually, it is possible to pose data in R that includes c1 and a1 but no
banana. In the ball case, there could be a second ball that interacts with
the first ball after the collision, reinstating trajectory b1. For the sake of
the section title, call this the ‘switch’. (Bananas allow the first of the two
paradox states at p, the switch allows the second, and grey state solutions
involve neither.) Perhaps Grandfather had made a sperm deposit, or per-
haps he was a time traveller who travels forwards in time, sires offspring,
then travels back to sit around awaiting his death. In discussions of stan-
dard grandfather paradoxes switch solutions are generally dismissed with
a chuckle or a sneer, but in the case of ideal elastic balls they are every
bit as good and bad as bananas. They equally resolve the paradox, and
equally entail constraints. So we should say that it is not possible to pose
data in R that includes c1 and a1 but no banana or switch.
But there is another kind of solution, which, following Krasnikov
(2002), I will call ‘lions’. Lions are loop objects, objects that exist just as
a loop along a CTC, without beginning or end. Arntzenius and Maudlin
give a nice example of a simple lion (2002, 182). Here is another: Dr.
Who removes a steel ball from a pillar in Trafalgar Square in 2000, takes
it back to 1900 and places it on the pillar, where it remains until 2000.
(There is no ‘hard and fast’ distinction between loop objects and complex
casual loops in general, but we will ignore that for simplicity.) Lions
require internal consistency constraints, for example, requiring entropy
reversals, but so do any complex data on CTCs. Deutch (1991) rules out
all but the simplest cases of this kind of solution on dubious grounds
which he calls a Principle of Philosophy of Science—Popper’s Evolution-
ary Principle which claims that knowledge takes time to develop, which
in Deutch’s story turns into the principle that entropy in a region with a
closed timelike curve cannot be less that it is before Cauchy horizon.
Suppose, then, a lion appears, temporally between R and p, and disrupts
the trajectory, preventing the paradox. Our point is that lions fit “some-
thing must happen to prevent the paradox” just as well as bananas.
Whether it is possible for a lion to appear between R and p but not appear
in R depends on where region R is located with respect to the wormhole.
But to assert that ‘logic’ (contradictions cannot happen, something must
happen to prevent the contradiction) entails constraints is false. Tim’s
attempt could be located such that a lion may appear before he succeeds
in killing grandfather.
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But even if data is posed in a region such that it’s not possible for a
lion to appear between R and p, there could be lions in region R, and
this is so for any R in a time travel region. This means that constraints
in the time travel region do not entail earlier constraints (e.g., here now),
and hence the worry that ‘logic’ could be refuted by present observations
is also misplaced.
Further let us allow Lewis to “yabber on” a bit further. On Lewisian
metaphysics, what would happen if Tim tried to kill his grandfather?
According to Lewis’ similarity relation for evaluating counterfactuals high
value is placed on maximising regions of perfect match. Without pausing
to figure out how Lewis’ semantics work within time travel regions, we
can in any case note that the closest worlds in which Tim tries to kill
grandfather involve lions, not bananas, since the latter entail changes to
all previous history. Thus Lewis’ program favors lions over bananas and
hence does not in general require constraints on initial data.
4. Does ‘Physics’ Explain Why Contradictions Do Not Occur? According
to Novikov the laws of physics automatically prevent the paradox just
like gravity prevents people walking up walls. How are they supposed to
do this? We should think of the laws as acting on the initial conditions.
Then we must ask why the physics gives us the grey state rather than the
paradox state. Unfortunately the physics does not tell us this. At least,
the dynamics of the particular phenomenon, acting locally as physics does,
does not tell us. Applying the physics locally to the initial state in the
fashion customary in physics leads just as well to the paradox state as to
a grey state. To rule out the paradox state in favor of the grey state one
needs the ‘Global Consistency Constraint’, something like: “The possible
states include only those which can be continued to a consistent global
solution.” There is a debate about the status of the Global Consistency
Constraint: is it part of the laws or not? (Earman 1995, 175; Riggs 1997;
Kutach 2003, 1111–1112; Freidman et al. 1990). I suppose one could go
either way on this.
But either way, Global Consistency amounts to a demand for logical
consistency: the problem with the Polchinski paradox solution is one
cannot both have a collision and not have a collision at one and the same
space-time location. In effect, Global Consistency tells us you cannot have
a contradiction, something else must happen. But this is exactly the ‘logic’
solution to paradoxes. Thus it would be disingenuous to appeal to Global
Consistency to demonstrate the superiority of the ‘physics’ approach over
the ‘logic’ approach. ‘Physics’ only explains why there never are contra-
dictions by appeal to Global Consistency; but Global Consistency is pretty
much logical consistency, the very thing that Artnzenius and Maudlin say
does not explain why there never are contradictions. Thus the claim that
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‘physics’ but not ‘logic’ explains why there never are contradictions is just
false.
Some physicists have argued that Global Consistency is a demand for
no new physics, which seems to make it very different to a demand for
logical consistency. According to Friedman et al., it might be that CTC’s
trigger new kinds of local physics for a quantum mechanical system such
that there is a multi valued wave function involving all the consistent and
inconsistent trajectories, and new physics to determine the outcomes of
measurements (1990, 1917). Global Consistency rules this out, they say,
otherwise one would take it to be “tautological” and “trivial.”
While the suggestion is of interest, allowing as it does that for such
‘new physics’ it would be physically possible for something to kill its own
quantum-mechanical grandfather; as a claim about Global Consistency
it is misleading, for the following reason. Global Consistency is not a
claim for logical consistency simpliciter, it is a claim for logical consistency
given a certain physics. To see this, note that it rules out for example the
local state (call it state D) where the ball passes without collision point
p in Figure 1a. This state cannot be continued to a globally consistent
solution since it will continue to the state (call it state E) where, at the
same space time point, collide with itself, and where state E is of course
logically inconsistent with state D. But to suppose D ‘continues to state
E’ we assume our laws. It is logically but not physically possible to have
state D where it does not continue to state E, but rather comes to a stop
before the collision in violation of Newton’s first law of motion. Similarly,
it is logically but not physically possible to kill your grandfather, where
he subsequently rises from the dead. Thus Global Consistency—that only
local states that can be continued to a globally consistent solution are
possible—assumes a physics. It is a requirement that a given physics is
logically consistent (see Deutsch 1991 for a similar response).
This allows us to restate Friedman et al’s claim. Under their ‘new
physics’ Global Consistency is an inadequate statement of the requirement
for logical consistency and therefore should not be considered completely
general; under our physics it is an adequate requirement. This does not
change our claim that Global Consistency amounts at root to a claim for
logical consistency, and that it supplies no substantial distinction between
the ‘logic’ and physics’ approaches.
5. No-Initial-Constraints Arguments. “[Echeverria, Klinkhammer, and
Thorne] did not produce a rigorous proof that every initial trajectory has
a consistent continuation, but suggested that it is very plausible that every
initial trajectory has a consistent continuation. That is to say, they have
made it very plausible that, in the billiard ball wormhole case, the time
travel structure of such a wormhole space-time does not result in con-
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straints on states on spacelike surfaces in the non-time travel region”
(Arntzenius and Maudlin 2002, 189). If this is right then the “argument
that no constraints are imposed by time travel” is an inductive argument,
not a rigorous proof (Arntzenius and Maudlin 2002, 170). How good an
inductive argument? What follows is an argument that at least undermines
the inductive argument so far as it is based on grey state solutions. (‘Lion’
solutions considered above support the induction, but these are not grey
state solution and are available to ‘logic’.)
Proofs of consistent grey state solutions exist only for limited classes
of cases. Consequently, it has not been proved for any case that no initial
constraints are required. I will present the argument in terms of one single
case, but it can easily be translated into an argument about a class of
cases. I speak of ‘initial constraints’ in a single case, when of course what
is proved in a single case is that a particular set of data can be continued
to a consistent solution. I ask the reader to bear with me on this until
the discussion following the proof.
The proof is this: Take a case, say of a single ball, where a consistent
grey state solution has been demonstrated, and suppose for the moment
that there is a unique consistent solution. A paradox monger could re-
spond by introducing a second ball with a trajectory intended to knock
out the consistent solution, but leave the paradox trajectory untouched.
Two obvious possibilities suggest themselves. First, there is a pair of grey
state collisions that allow a globally consistent solution to this two-body
problem. Or, second, there is no such pair of grey state collisions, and
hence there are initial constraints—the two-body initial state is not pos-
sible. If the latter is the case, then there are indeed initial constraints in
the original one-ball case, namely, there cannot be a second ball with the
trajectory just described. This is not so much a constraint on the initial
state of the single ball, but one built into the background conditions when
one asserts this is a one-ball case in the manner of the physicist. But it
is an initial constraint all the same.
To prove that no initial constraints are involved in the one-ball case it
is necessary to prove that there are grey state solutions for both the one-
ball and two-ball cases. But it is not sufficient, because a paradox monger
could introduce a third ball to knock out the two-ball consistent trajectory
but not the original paradox trajectory, etc. Therefore in proving there
exists a consistent solution to the one-ball case one has not thereby proved
no initial constraints are required, ditto for the two-ball case, etc.
Suppose now that there is more than one consistent solution to the
original one-body case. The paradox monger might then require more
than one additional ball to reinstate the paradox. But otherwise the ar-
gument goes through in the same way. Suppose then there is an infinite
number of consistent solutions to the original one-ball case. Could one
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conclude that no set of additional background factors could be fixed in
such a way as to reinstate the paradox? This would need to be proved.
Only then could one say that a proof of a consistent set of solutions
proves that no initial constraints are required, and then only in the case
where the set is infinite. Of course no such proof exists. QED.
It may be objected that all I have proved is the trivial point that so-
lutions in the one-ball case are not solutions for a two-ball case. But
consider again the context here. A problem is supposed to exist for ‘logic’
approach even in a single case such as Tim’s banana slip: it looks like
the background is “cooked,” that is, the solution requires a special back-
ground configuration. Grey state solutions are claimed to not be cooked
in this way. What I have shown is that there is no proof that grey state
solutions are not cooked.
It may be objected that one merely needs to be clear about how the
inductive argument is supposed to go. It cannot be: no constraints in this
case, no constraints in that case, . . . therefore, no constraints anywhere.
Rather, it should be: consistent solution here, consistent solution here,
. . . therefore, consistent solutions everywhere. Therefore, no constraints.
But, I would reply, if every instance of a proven consistent solution lacks
a proof that the solution requires no special background constraints, then
this indeed undermines that inductive argument to the conclusion that
every possible initial configuration can be continued to a consistent
solution.
6. The Difficulty of More Complex Grey State Solutions. If results con-
cerning grey state solutions are to be applied to discussions of standard
grandfather paradoxes then the inductive argument discussed in the pre-
vious section need to carry us from the idealised physics to messy real
cases. But it is a long way from idealised elastic balls to people killing
each other. The existence of grey state mechanisms in tractable idealised
physics is not a strong indication that there exist plausible mechanisms
in highly complex real life cases. ‘Tim tries to kill grandfather but merely
inflicts heritable brain damage which Tim inherits and which causes him
to wound but not kill’ is not a plausible mechanism. In this final section
we illustrate the challenge of finding plausible mechanisms even for slightly
more complex cases.
Consider a ‘proof’ due to Novikov (1992), involving a piston in a tube.
Tubes are connected to the mouths of a small wormhole. An object, call
it a ‘piston’, travels along the tubes. The paradox argument says you
could set this up so that the piston travels through the wormhole and
blocks itself, contradiction. This inconsistent solution occurs as follows.
Let L1 and L2 be the lengths of the tube segments connecting the center-
point Z with wormhole mouths A and B respectively. Let dt be the time
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shift (into the past) resulting from travel through the wormhole from A
to B. Assume that the length and hence time of travel through the worm-
hole is negligible. Let dt1 be the difference between the moments of arrival
at Z of the younger and older versions of the piston assuming no collision.
Let v1 be the velocity of the piston, which is constant since we assume
friction from the tube is negligible. (We might add this also assumes
nothing happens to the piston velocity as it travels through the wormhole).
We also suppose that the piston length is negligible compared to L1 and
L2. Taking tp0 as the point where the piston first reaches the junction,
we can then write the ‘inconsistent solution’:
(L  L )/v  dt  dtp 0, (1)1 2 1 1
where the first term gives the time it takes the piston to travel from Z
back to Z. (1) gives the solution of dt1 in terms of v1. Thus any choice of
v1 will give a paradox provided it give a value of dt1 large enough that
the older version of the piston arrives before the younger.
However, argues Novikov, there is another solution which is consistent.
For the same input velocity v1, suppose the piston versions arrive at
roughly the same time so the younger scrapes the end of the older one.
Let dt2 be the difference between the moments of arrival at Z of the
younger and older versions of the piston assuming now that there is a
collision. Let dv be the change in velocity due to the action of friction,
that is, dvp v1 v2. dv is a function dv(dt2, v2). “This function is known,”
says Novikov, although he does not say what it is except that its depen-
dence on dt2 is “very steep.”
Novikov then writes:
(L  L )/v  dt  dtp 0, (2)1 2 2 2
v p v  dv(dt , v ). (3)2 1 2 2
We need to solve these two equations together. Novikov claims it can be
done, and so it can be demonstrated that any initial conditions can be
continued to a consistent solution. I will, however, follow a different route.
dv(dt2, v2) is the change in velocity due to the action of friction. It is a
function of dt2 because that gives the time for which the friction force
acts, and it is a function of v2 because that affects the size of the impact
force. However, let us simplify to illustrate how the physics works; firstly
by ignoring the latter.
Suppose then that dv(dt2). dv approaches its maximum dvMAX as dt2
approaches 0, although it cannot actually be zero. dv approaches its min-
imum as dt2 approaches dt2MAX, the point at which the older self of the
puck just clips the end of its earlier self. The latter is a constant set by
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v1 and the dimensions of the puck. dvMAX is set by the facts of friction
and v1. Suppose, again for simplicity, that dv(dt2) is linear (with t2 for dt2):
dv/dv p 1 t /t . (4)MAX 2 2MAX
With (3) this gives
v /dv p t /t  v /dv  1. (5)2 MAX 2 2MAX 1 MAX
With (2) this gives v2 in terms of initial and standing conditions
2v /dv  v (dt/t  v /dv  1) (L  L )/t p 0. (6)2 MAX 2 2MAX 1 MAX 1 2 2MAX
This function (on the left hand side) is continuous and the equation
has one or two solutions. A number of difficulties arise. First, the physics
of the grey state remains paradoxical even if there is a solution. Equation
(4) tells us the larger t2, the smaller dv, and hence the larger v2. This makes
sense because the effects of friction should be smaller the shorter the
period of contact. However, the kinematics tells us the smaller v2, the
larger t2, since the older version of the piston arrives later. Thus there is
a paradox in the very physics of the grey state.
But we may leave this aside, because there are other difficulties lurking.
There are range restrictions imposed by the standing conditions obtaining
in the grey state. The general form of equation (6) has sometimes two
solutions and sometime one, for . The solution depends on the var-v 1 02
ious initial and standing conditions in the function. However there are
also upper and lower bounds set by the fact that the earlier and later
versions of the piston must collide, viz.:
v  dv 1 v 1 v .1 MAX 2 1
There is in general no guarantee that there is a solution for (6) within
this range. The function on the left hand side of (6) starts, for , atv p 02
(L1L2)/t2MAX, then drops, before heading towards positive values. One
hopes it passes the solution point after the lower bound but before the
upper bound. When one writes out the values of the function at these
two bounds, it seems that whether the solution lies between them depends
on the initial and standing conditions, for example, on a friction function,
which could be changed by greasing the end of the piston. So then we
would have to dream up another grey state mechanism to deal with a
case that supposed to be settled.
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